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 INTEREST GROUPS AND THE PROBLEM WITH INCREMENTALISM 
Saul Levmore* 
 
Incrementalism, as opposed to dramatic change, is conventionally lauded in law as the 
prudent path of change--a path that gives credit to history and precedent. But the conventional 
view pays little attention to interest groups. Step-by-step change poses a serious problem when it 
alters the constellation of supporters and opponents of further moves. The core problem is that 
once an interest group loses and becomes subject to some regulation, it has reason to turn on its 
competitors and encourage that they be similarly regulated. The laws that emerge on the 
incrementalist’s path may therefore not mark progress toward socially desirable or democratic 
outcomes. Examples include environmental standards, smoking bans, disability 
accommodations, and minimum age legislation, but nearly all law can be seen as incrementalist, 
just as most tradeoffs might be described as on slippery slopes. The incrementalism problem is 
most striking where a prior regulatory step is, from the perspective of those who must comply, 
costly to reverse. The problem is reduced where there is real learning from experience; it is 
enlarged where advocates of change implement a divide-and-conquer strategy to separate 
defending interests. It is possible that compensation policies or even moratoria on certain kinds 
of regulation can be used to decrease wasteful rent-seeking and to minimize the interest-group 
problem. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 It is easy to encourage lawmakers to be moderate, or incrementalist. The case for 
incrementalism, or against dramatic change, where moderation and way stations could be 
managed, is built on claims about unintended consequences, expectations, risk aversion, and 
learning by doing. Meanwhile, any proposal for sweeping change can be derided as the product 
of impatience and an inadequate appreciation of history and precedent. Incrementalists favor 
leaps over baby steps only where systems are regarded as entirely broken and where bad habits 
need to be broken with prods rather than nudges. Incrementalism may also be encouraged by the 
presence of multiple sources of law, and where lawmaking is an interactive venture. Legislatures, 
courts, executive officers, administrative agencies, and even voters interrelate, and incremental 
lawmaking is often the strategy most respectful of the other players’ roles. In this stew, each 
cook is told to fear that drastic action will spoil the broth. Incrementalism is encouraged by 
leading commentators.1 Most of the encouragement is directed at judges, but the arguments used 
                                                 
* William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I am grateful for suggestions received from 
Brian Hanessian, Faye Paul, Ariel Porat, Zak Rosenfield, Cass Sunstein, and colleagues at a faculty workshop at the 
University of Chicago Law School. 
1 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 4 (1999) 
(arguing that minimalism promotes deliberative democracy); Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 
Yale L.J. 480, 519-522 (2008) (contrasting the cost-benefit approach, which looks for the “best” policy, with the 
Burkean approach, which is incrementalist rather than drastic); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. 
L. Rev. 353, 362-366 (2006) (defending a form of Burkean judicial minimalism that restrains judges to shallow and 
2 
in favor of incrementalism are at least as applicable to regulators and legislators. Incrementalism 
might also mean different things to different observers; one person’s moderation is another’s 
drastic change, and every new law can be seen as a step towards more far-reaching change. For 
present purposes, a proposal is incrementalist if advocates of more drastic change will support 
the proposal both because they approve the change it represents and because it may be a step 
toward their larger goal. It is, for example, incrementalist to propose a limitation on gun 
ownership or on a smoking ban with the aim of an eventual prohibition of all firearms or of 
smoking in all public places.  
 The conventional view of incrementalism pays little attention to interest groups. There is 
a serious problem with piecemeal change, however, when it alters the constellation of supporters 
and opponents of further moves and gives organized interest groups reason to realign themselves 
in response to the incrementalist change. I begin with such matters as the prohibition of smoking 
in restaurants, while it remained legal in bars and hotels, and the requirement of ramps and other 
disability accommodations, initially in new buildings and then in some older structures. 
However, one can substitute almost freely the imposition of progressively more exacting fuel 
economy standards on automobile manufacturers and the establishment of incentives to achieve 
targeted reductions in heat-trapping gases.2 Incrementalism is everywhere, though certainly not 
everywhere alike. There is little reason to be confident that the laws that emerge on the 
incrementalist’s path represent progress towards socially desirable, or democratic, outcomes--
though I will make the realistic assumption in most of the examples here that we are uncertain as 
to the location of the social optimum. Part I describes representative cases, and explores what I 
call the “incrementalism problem.” I develop the idea that this problem is especially interesting 
where a prior regulatory step is, from the perspective of those who must comply, irreversible. 
Part II takes on a common defense of incrementalism, that policymakers learn from experience 
and therefore from small, prior steps, and suggests that this defense is rather weak. The 
discussion extends the scope of the incrementalism problem to minimum-age legislation and to 
the larger topic of slippery (and nonslippery) slopes. Part III explores the idea of using 
compensation as a tool with which to solve the incrementalism problem. Compensation could 
push groups to form coalitions so that they can optimally defend against the divide-and-conquer 
strategy that is at the core of the incrementalism problem. It is an offshoot of the claim that, in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
narrow changes in law). Most of the cases discussed in this Article deal with legislation and regulation, although 
some of the changes, such as disability accommodations, have also come about through judicial action. The 
argument advanced here applies to judicial decisions, for they too are influenced by interest groups, in litigation as 
well as in appointment and confirmation. However, the influence is different. Stare decisis also changes the 
argument as it is applied to courts. Finally, as is well known, various doctrines and conventions limit interest groups’ 
ability to control the order in which incremental (or drastic) change is proposed to courts. See generally Maxwell L. 
Stearns, Constitutional Process: A Social Choice Analysis of Supreme Court Decision Making (2000); 
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1309 (1995) 
(standing doctrine ameliorates ability of litigants to control the critically important path of legal decisions). For the 
most part, the incrementalism problem as found in judicial decisions is left for another day. 
2 As we will see, the last example represents a serious incrementalism problem. However, fuel efficiency 
standards do not, because they resemble minimum age legislation and other regulation that does not divide and 
conquer different groups. See infra Section III.C. 
3 
world with overachieving interest groups, we need organized groups to oppose one another in 
order to get good results.3 This coalition-formation, or power-politics, approach to 
incrementalism proves difficult. One problem is specifying the trigger that brings about 
compensation; virtually every proposed law can be framed as embedded in a larger picture such 
that every law is a sly incrementalist move. Another problem becomes apparent when the focus 
moves from power politics to rent-seeking, because the possibility of obtaining compensation is 
likely to increase wasteful rent-seeking by those who gain from influencing lawmakers. The 
problems with most things compensatory suggest a solution, sketched in Part IV, that begins with 
upfront disclosure of regulatory aims, and then provides for a moratorium on regulation beyond a 
specified limit. Again, the problem is more apparent than the solution. A brief conclusion 
follows and suggests that we be aware that incrementalism in lawmaking should be feared as 
often as it is welcomed. As the discussion works toward this conclusion, it has two aims, one 
positive and one normative. The first is to develop a tool of analysis; the incrementalism problem 
and its possible solutions can help us understand the path of lawmaking and the role of interest 
groups in forging that path. The normative aim is to argue with those who believe in moderation 
in all, or most, things. My claim is that this view of optimal change ignores the presence of 
interest groups. 
 
I. Incrementalism and Irreversibility 
 
A. The Incrementalism Problem 
 
 Consider a case in which the American Association of People with Disabilities, or 
perhaps an advocate for disabled veterans, seeks to impose new building requirements in a 
jurisdiction that previously required accessibility only in new construction. The proposal is to 
mandate wheelchair-accommodating ramps in all commercial buildings, and thus to require 
substantial retrofitting.4 Owners of these buildings are opposed, if only because compliance will 
                                                 
3 See Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking and Tax Reform, Contemp. Pol’y Issues, Oct. 1998, at 37, 46 ("Many 
years ago, James Buchanan suggested a solution: The U.S. could select--perhaps at random--some other group of 
people about the same size as the benefited group and could put the tax on them. Thus, two lobbying groups would 
be opposing each other and the outcome presumably would be improved."). On assessing the power of interest 
groups and the magnitude of rent-seeking behavior, see Paul J. Stancil, Assessing Interest Groups: A Playing Field 
Approach, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1273 (2008). 
4 The actual progression of the law has been complex. In 1968, Congress passed the Architectural Barriers Act, 
which requires accommodations for people with disabilities in all new federally funded construction. 42 U.S.C. §§ 
4151-57 (2006). A variety of other regulations culminated in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which 
requires “reasonable accommodation” to the disabled in all places of employment with fifteen or more employees 
and in all places of public accommodation. Pub L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101-213 (2006); 47 U.S.C. 225, 611 (2006)). The latter category is a broad one that includes most places in which 
commercial activity is undertaken. The determination of what accommodation is reasonable is largely left to the 
courts. Architectural requirements for new construction are remarkably detailed. See U.S. Architectural & Transp. 
Barriers Compliance Bd., Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and 
Facilities (2002), available at http://www.access-board.gov/adaag/html/adaag.htm#purpose (detailing complex 
requirements for ramps, stairs, elevators, drinking fountains, and many other features of new structures). For a 
4 
be costly. These owners did not choose to install ramps before the law required them to do so, 
even though it might have helped them generate more revenue since most other buildings 
remained inaccessible. They will argue that disabled persons can work and shop in other 
buildings where ramps have been voluntarily constructed, or where ramps have been required by 
law in new construction. These vulnerable property owners would like to gain political support 
from other groups, including their tenants, owners of multifamily residential buildings, small 
shop owners whose structures are likely excluded from the category of “commercial buildings,” 
and perhaps even owners of single-family homes. But even the most sophisticated members of 
these groups are unsure whether to devote resources to opposing or supporting the proposal. 
From the perspective of shop owners, for example, the proposal will increase their competitors’ 
costs, much as the previous legislation benefited many of them indirectly by raising the costs of 
new construction. Sophisticated owners recognize that advocates or lawmakers who champion 
the cause of mandated accommodations will likely advance their agenda step by step. Store 
owners and even homeowners might wonder whether they will eventually be required to modify 
their properties at significant cost, and with very little prospect of offsetting revenues. 
 The most straightforward version of what I will call the “incrementalism problem” 
depicts the accommodation advocates as considering the benefits, but not the costs, of 
accommodations and as aiming to push the law as far as they can. Perhaps they favor 
government-mandated access ramps wherever there are stairs and no lift, and of course doors 
could be widened and products on shelves made more accessible. These advocates, as I will call 
those who wish to alter the status quo, perceive that if these aspirations were packaged into a law 
and proposed in one swoop, in dramatic rather than incremental fashion, they would be defeated. 
The loss would occur because of the combined resistance of owners, especially those who could 
be easily organized in order to overcome the familiar collective action problem, joined perhaps 
by tenants and retailers.5 If the advocates begin with large commercial buildings, where the cost-
                                                                                                                                                             
detailed evolution of these regulations, see Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing 
the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1341, 1376-
1405 (1993). Regulation of residential buildings is governed by the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which was amended to 
include people with disabilities in 1988. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 
(2006)). Under the FHA, landlords must allow disabled tenants to make adjustments to unit and common spaces. In 
addition, all new residential buildings with four or more units must be made handicap-accessible. The example in 
the text may also be understood as concerning local law, which often precedes or adds to federal law. California, for 
example, enacted broad disability legislation in 1980, and this regime has been updated frequently and, we might 
say, incrementally. See The Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12900-96 (West 2009). For a 
general overview, see Michael L. Murphy, Assembly Bill 2222: California Pushes and Breaks the Disability Law 
Envelope, 51 Cath. U. L. Rev. 495 (2002). The example in the text is intentionally ambiguous as to whether the 
requirement will attach to all older buildings or only to those on which some renovation or other work is done. The 
ambiguity reflects the pattern of existing law, in which the rules for new construction apply to the modification of 
older buildings, while the owners of untouched older buildings must simply remove architectural barriers that can 
readily be eliminated. But it also suggests that courts or agencies can choose to be more or less aggressive in 
declaring which buildings must be modified.  
5 There is the question of why new construction has been regulated more readily than old buildings or retailers. 
It is normally less expensive to build ramps when starting anew than it is to retrofit, so a cost-benefit analysis might 
have caused lawmakers to favor regulating new construction either as a start or simply to earn the highest social rate 
of return for a given investment. New construction costs also fall largely on dispersed and unidentifiable future 
5 
benefit calculus is likely to be most compelling, because ramps involve fixed costs and more 
users suggest greater benefit, then the opposition might be dispersed, modest in number, and 
unsympathetic. If successful here, the advocates can turn their attention and political resources to 
other structures, stores, or residential buildings.6 In this next step, the property owners whom the 
previous step directly affected will have no reason to oppose the extension of the law. In fact, 
they will likely favor the next incremental move because it levels the playing field.7 A ramp 
requirement will not raise the marginal cost of products in stores, but it might push some stores 
out of business and raise rents in the commercial buildings already regulated. The 
incrementalism problem is that a legal intervention might be both socially inefficient and 
democratically disfavored, and yet it might come about because advocates can nudge the law 
there step by step, taking advantage of uncoordinated opponents. The advocates might do this 
without any grand design, but the problem is more obvious where there is a strategy. An early 
target of regulation may not plan or be expected to turn against its competitor, but it will not 
work hard to protect its competitor against regulation.  
 We might think of the incrementalism problem as one of several ways in which the 
output of a political or judicial process appears paradoxical. There are intransitivities that cannot 
be solved; a number of voting paradoxes drive home the point that when we aggregate 
preferences we often get results that seem illogical but are in fact nearly inevitable.8 Then there 
are slippery slopes, such that the final resting point of law is something unwanted when the 
polity started down the slope. Transaction costs, self-interest, and a variety of other factors can 
make this so. The guiding principle in all these sources of unease is that law can be path 
                                                                                                                                                             
owners of properties, who may simply be less able to stand up to the advocates for improved access. In any event, 
the owners of newly constructed and regulated buildings have no great reason to favor (or disfavor) the regulation of 
preexisting structures unless they think that some of these will close down and rents will rise elsewhere. 
6 The tale in the text depicts a strategic advocacy group, but the incrementalism problem does not depend on 
conscious, strategic behavior. Advocates may innocently push for an incremental change, because they perceive that 
the smaller change is all that can be obtained at present. They may be unaware of the alignment of interest groups 
opposed to the changes they support. It is nevertheless a problem if this happens repeatedly, as if there were strategic 
division of the defense, and in a manner that takes us away from the social optimum. 
7 Competition is probably the key to recognition. For example, in 2009, United Parcel Service (UPS) supported 
legislation that would put FedEx, its direct competitor, under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), when it had previously operated under the Railway Labor Act. Alex Roth, FedEx and UPS Clash Over 
Legislation, Wall St. J., July 20, 2009, at B1. An important difference between the regulatory structures is that 
workers can unionize on a location-by-location basis under the former, but not the latter. The reach of the Railway 
Act and of the NLRB can be thought of as incrementally altered. 
8 Voting paradoxes, arising out of preferences that cannot be aggregated in a way guaranteed to be consistent 
and to meet other seemingly simple requirements of democratic decisionmaking, are well known. See William H. 
Riker & Steven J. Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1235, 1241 (1973) (analyzing the 
logrolling paradox and concluding that “if each [legislator] behaves rationally and makes the trades possible for him, 
all the members suffer. They are, in fact, worse off than if they had voted sincerely or naively”). The problems may 
be compounded in the presence of overachieving interest groups. See generally Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes 
and Interest Groups, 28 J. Legal Stud. 259 (1999) (discussing basic voting paradox as well as logrolling and other 
voting paradoxes and introducing the idea that interest groups exploit paradoxes). These paradoxes are also present 
in the context of judicial processes. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 
823-831 (1982) (examining the decision-making processes of the Supreme Court from a public choice perspective 
and concluding that inconsistency is inevitable in such an institution). 
6 
dependent in a way that is troubling even to citizens who do not have idealistic expectations of 
law.9  
 This somewhat stylized tale of mandated investments, that may or may not be socially 
efficient, involves strategic behavior by advocates but little foresight on the part of those who 
would be regulated. In the accommodations example, it is easy to see the incrementalism 
problem from the perspective of the owners of significant commercial properties, but of course 
that is not the same as asserting that there is a serious social problem. That conclusion, and the 
quest for solutions to it, normally requires that the optimal regulation be identified. Here, as 
elsewhere, that is unlikely both because some of the costs are nonpecuniary and because 
extensive experimentation and data gathering would be required in order to assess the benefits of 
accommodations in selected locations, the effects of subsidies for accommodations, the share of 
benefits that might be obtained with modifications only to buildings located near accessible 
public transportation, and so forth. The same will be true for other instances of incremental 
lawmaking by legislatures, courts, and agencies. Indeed, one question to address is whether this 
incrementalism problem has any bounds at all. For the present, I address the question of the 
social optimum as well as that of boundaries by suggesting that we first get a sense of the 
problem of incrementalism and then see whether it can be solved in a way that runs little risk of 
creating a social problem where none had previously existed.  
 The incrementalism problem may also take the form of producing the “wrong” regulation 
rather than too much regulation. If A wants to gain Z by regulating W, then X, then on to Y, and 
then finally to Z, and the social optimum is likely to be W, A may look to start with the group 
that cannot only be divided and conquered but also that which will be most effective if it joins A 
and turns on a competitor in the second step. A may have the political power to take any one 
step, and it may, for example, bring about the regulation of X, knowing that X will then turn on 
Y with some political power. Power politics may be such that it all ends with WXY, when in fact 
it ought ideally to have ended with W alone or perhaps WX. In most of what follows, examples 
are constructed to emphasize the problem of too much regulation. However, it should be 
understood that there may instead, or also, be this danger of the wrong regulation. For example, 
smoking bans may have been imposed on restaurants before bars not because there is more 
second-hand smoke in restaurants or because a cost-benefit calculus suggested that the restaurant 
ban was the superior “investment,” but rather because advocates perceived that restaurant 
owners, once regulated, would be better at overcoming their collective action problem in order to 
bring about the regulation of bars than the other way around. Once regulated, each group would 
likely favor the extension of the ban to the other inasmuch as they are rivals for patrons. If 
                                                 
9 In describing the mechanisms of the slippery slope, Eugene Volokh describes how mandatory gun registration 
could lead to gun confiscation, even though confiscation could not have garnered sufficient support at the initial 
stage. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1026, 1033 (2003) 
(“Registration may change people’s attitudes about the propriety of confiscation, by making them view gun 
possession not as a right but as a privilege that the government grants and therefore may deny.”). 
  
7 
advocates’ perceptions are incorrect, this incrementalism may cause the regulation to end with 
restaurants even if the social optimum includes the regulation of bars. 
 Returning to the specific case of access ramps, it is plausible that the cost of retrofitting 
buildings makes the optimum policy one of requiring ramps only for large buildings where this 
cost is spread over many users. In the absence of legal intervention, the market might arrive at 
something close to this conclusion on its own and might improve on legal intervention by 
settling on ramps in some but not all locations of each type.10 In any event, let us posit that 
existing single-family homes and small shops will definitely escape regulation, either because 
lawmakers uniformly perceive such regulation to be socially inefficient, because advocates 
choose to expend their political capital on higher-valued ends, or because the owners of these 
homes and shops, however dispersed, have enough political power to defend against the 
considerable costs that would be imposed. Still, it is clear that inefficient law might come about 
because of the divide-and-conquer strategy. Storeowners, for example, are not well organized 
and do not know whether to join with the owners of larger commercial properties in opposing 
regulation that is drafted to apply only to the latter group. It may be that they free ride on the 
defense mounted by the larger property owners; it may be that they are simply too dispersed to 
organize in opposition; and it may be that they miscalculate how far legislation will go, though 
this last mistake has little to do with incrementalism.  
 If all structures in a jurisdiction were owned by a single party, there would be no 
incrementalism problem, or at least not one of the kind defined here. Based on the details first (or 
subsequently and incrementally) proposed, a property owner might miscalculate the investment it 
should make in opposing legal intervention. There might, in this sense, be an incrementalism 
issue, but one not different from that faced by participants in markets and politics everywhere 
who must assess the intensity of preferences and the strategic behavior of other parties. If A 
seeks to return a product purchased from B, or sues B because the product was found injurious, 
B needs to decide on its response without knowing whether A or another buyer will subsequently 
seek to return other products or bring suit regarding other injuries. B may underinvest or 
overinvest, but we normally expect B to bargain with A, and we use the law of fraud to constrain 
the responses the parties give one another when asked specific questions. Somewhat similarly, 
when X and Y contract, X may get better terms by implying that over time it will order more of 
Y’s goods if satisfied; in response, Y may lower its price or overinvest in servicing the account. 
Y can protect itself in the contracting process. Y can stipulate that the price of each item shipped 
to X will be q dollars, but that there will be a discount to p dollars if X orders more than a 
thousand of the items within the calendar year. If this creates too much of a risk that Y will lower 
quality, X can contract for extra payments in the event of defective products, and so forth. The 
incrementalism problem can in this way be seen as a problem of incomplete information; Y and 
                                                 
10 Market solutions normally involve change over time so that we do not expect all property owners who install 
ramps to do so at the same time. The owners may have different costs, discount rates, and so forth. A legal mandate 
generally requires compliance in a specified time period; sometimes the effective date is in the future and even then 
different owners can comply at different times. Effective dates and grandfather clauses are other sources of 
incrementalism and subjects of interest group activity. 
8 
X can overcome this problem, to a degree, with more bargaining. The property owners who fear 
regulation by the government are less able to solve their problem this way because they have 
much higher transaction costs. They may need to bargain with legislators and with a variety of 
interest groups.  
 Moreover, bargains with governments are not so easily made or enforced. It is difficult 
for the government to “precommit” regarding future law,11 and markets for hedging the risk of 
future law are undeveloped. But the easiest way to think about the singular character of the 
incrementalism problem may be to recognize that when commercial parties, like X and Y, face 
incomplete information about subsequent transactions, they operate within the discipline of the 
market. X can make contractual demands on Y regarding future business because X can 
otherwise find another supplier who will guarantee future prices or quality. The government, 
however, faces little market pressure. When it-–or the interest groups or temporary legislatures 
that comprise “it”-–misleads property owners about future regulation, there is normally no 
recourse.12 If the government were a benevolent monopolist, there would be little of an 
incrementalism problem because it would have no reason to hide its regulatory intentions or its 
cost-benefit analyses. It is when the government is an intermediary of sorts, motivated by 
competing interest groups, that the incrementalism problem becomes a threat as a result of the 
coordination problem among groups.  
 It bears repeating that a coordination issue is not necessarily a social problem. If the 
advocates, rather than the defender-owners, have serious organization costs, then it may be a 
good thing if they can divide and conquer the property owners, as that might help the process of 
power politics find its way to the social optimum.13 Indeed, many of the examples advanced here 
can be shaped so as to depict the advocates of change as the players with the collective action 
problem, who might be divided and conquered, or stymied. It is only by choosing examples 
where the advocates have a unitary goal, while the defenders must not only coordinate politically 
but also be prepared to suffer significant compliance costs in the event of regulation, that the 
incrementalism problem is made to appear on one side alone.14 Regardless of whether the 
                                                 
11 See Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 Va. L. Rev., 567, 618-22 (1996) (noting that, absent internal 
congressional regulations to facilitate precommitments, the judiciary is likely to strike down serious restrictions on 
legislative second thoughts as undemocratic in nature). 
12 There is the question of how a monopolist would impose or price ramps in a market where subsequent 
“customers” valued the ramps at decreasing amounts. But I do not pursue this analogy here because the emphasis is 
on interest groups. 
13 This is one application of the analysis in Eric Posner, Kathryn Spier, & Adrian Vermeule, Divide and 
Conquer 38-39(Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law Working Paper No.09-24, 2009) (asserting that the divide-and-conquer 
strategy is ubiquitous; it is normatively hard to assess unless we know the social optimum; a fairly common 
“solution” is to impose a kind of equal treatment rule). Note that the equal treatment rule suggested by Posner et al. 
is unworkable in our regulatory setting because of the difficulty in identifying when situations are alike. Moreover, 
there is presumably some optimum that contradicts the value of equal treatment. It cannot possibly be that ramps 
should be everywhere. 
14 The focus on advocates rather than defenders might also be justified with the observation that the advocates 
set the agenda; they are on the attack and it is easier to think of them as dividing and conquering the defenders than 
the other way around. 
9 
collective action problem is as great for advocates as it is for defenders, it may be useful to think 
of incrementalism as a problem of nondisclosure, or even as a kind of fraud, since we normally 
think that full information is a good idea. For example, if the initial access proposal made it seem 
as though ramps would not be required in stores and homes, then it would be troubling to learn 
that advocates moved step-by-step to include all buildings, especially when they induced the 
earlier losers to their side in the later steps of the political game. I will continue to refer to 
incrementalism as problematic, though troubling is sometimes a better word. An important but 
modest version of the argument advanced here is that we ought not celebrate incrementalism 
because it will normally be difficult to know whether incremental changes in law, and especially 
legislated law, are desirable.15 
 
B. Irreversibility 
 
 All instances of incrementalism are not alike. The prospect of smoking bans, by 
government order rather than by entrepreneurial decision, in aircraft, restaurants, hotels, offices, 
shops, and bars presents a different story than that of access ramps. It is tempting to see the same 
problem, or at least likelihood, of advocates’ going far past the social optimum as they take on 
one set of interests after another--defeating one at a time when they could not have defeated all at 
once. But a difference between the cases is that ramps represent a kind of irreversible, sunk cost, 
while smoking bans can be reversed.16 In theory, if advocates move on to bars after establishing 
                                                                                                                                                             
 It should be noted that the incrementalism exercise undertaken here does introduce a kind of status-quo 
bias, because I do not pause to ask how we came to the prevailing smoking, accommodation, or other policy that 
advocates now try to undo or outdo. But it is difficult to start in any other place, and the takings literature, which is 
something of a foil below, does much the same. There too we can ask whether existing property rights are fair or 
even efficient before we endeavor to restrain inefficient takings. See Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and 
Expanding Future, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 181, 183-189 (2003) (hypothesizing that property rights, both real and 
intellectual, may plausibly evolve as the result of wealth-maximizing allocations or interest group pressures; 
regulatory law normally assumes the former, and might add to the inefficiency when the latter is instead true); Saul 
Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S421, S423-433 (2002) (arguing 
that every instance of privatization may have a transaction-cost and interest-group explanation; without a great deal 
of evidence to determine the actual origin, further government interventions that in any way rearrange the status quo 
are hard to evaluate). 
15 A note of caution in the other direction is also appropriate. Incrementalism may produce the wrong results 
even where there is no collective action problem among interest groups. Defenders may under-invest if they think 
that each regulatory step is minor and not worth opposing with sufficient force. But this is a problem with all 
bargains, as discussed in the text. There is also the danger that disparate interest groups care about proposed 
regulations to a different degree, so that it will be difficult to allocate costs, and the danger of free-riding will, 
therefore, be greater. I do not emphasize this sort of collective action problem here because there is no reason to 
think this problem greater for advocates or defenders, and no reason to think it is more a problem with respect to 
incrementalist proposals than to more drastic ones. 
16 Once the ramps are built, the regulated party has no interest in reversing the ban because there is no marginal 
cost to further compliance. In contrast, a smoking ban presumably imposes continuing costs on the entrepreneur who 
objected to it. 
 Many other differences exist that do not advance the present argument. Thus, there is a case to be made 
against smoking bans on the ground that consumers can simply avoid establishments that permit smoking, so that 
some sorting will provide places that do and do not permit smoking. It is possible that it is more difficult for owners 
of buildings to capture a portion of the benefits created by access ramps. And it is certainly puzzling to observe 
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a ban on smoking in restaurants, bar owners and restaurateurs could join forces not only to block 
the proposed ban in bars but also to roll back the restriction on restaurants. In the case of access 
ramps, the requirement attached to commercial buildings might have been similarly reversed as 
part of a package once other interests formed a political coalition. However, the owners of 
commercial buildings will have already invested in compliance; it is not as if they can 
disassemble the ramps and sell them at cost. In fact, regulations of that kind are rarely reversed 
(in the absence of technological change) because there is very little political pressure to do so; 
there is little pressure because there is little benefit to those have invested in irreversible fashion. 
It is thus likely that the incrementalism problem is relatively serious in the case of disability 
accommodations because the divide–and-conquer strategy is likely to be successful because of 
the irreversibility feature. Once a group loses, it has no incentive to join the defense when the 
next group is attacked, and it may even have reason to support the attack.  
 This interesting difference between cases where compliance costs are essentially upfront, 
nonrefundable investments and cases where there are ongoing costs is less impressive if there is 
a kind of endowment effect with respect to regulation, so that once smoking is banned, for 
instance, parties and expectations adjust so that there is much less pressure to reverse a law than 
to prevent its enactment in the first place. Still, it is doubtful that such an endowment effect can 
ever be as powerful as the fact of irreversibility, so that the problem of incrementalism remains 
more remarkable where compliance with an earlier step in the regulatory process is irreversible. 
The incrementalism problem is itself reinforced by the endowment effect such that laws, once on 
the books, are not easily removed. 
 The problem is not as simple as sketched to this point. There is no reason to think that 
most owners targeted in the first step of ramp requirements will overlook the fact that the 
accommodations about to be required are costly and irreversible. If these owners think that 
political battle will help their cause, they will seek allies among other interest groups, and they 
will try to impress upon these potential allies that the advocates for access will surely turn next to 
requiring further accommodations. The irreversible character of the proposed ramps (or 
elevators, or many other required improvements) is neither secret nor subtle. It ought to affect 
the likelihood that disparate interest groups will form a coalition to battle against an early 
regulatory step.  
 In contrast, when the owners of restaurants try to convince the owners of bars to join 
them in fighting the proposed ban on smoking, both groups know that if they fail to form an 
alliance at the first step, there will be opportunity to form one later on if the second step of 
lawmaking develops. If we compare the targets of the first steps in the two regulatory arenas, we 
see that those who must add accessibility ramps are in some sense worse off than the 
restaurateurs subject to a smoking ban because the former’s compliance involves an upfront cost 
and is irreversible; on the other hand, the fact that the restaurateurs’ compliance is a matter of 
reversible, ongoing behavior makes it more difficult for them to acquire allies for a defense at the 
                                                                                                                                                             
overwhelming political success and yet so little market “success” in the preceding period. All this can be disputed 
and is, in any event, not necessary for the point advanced in the text.  
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first step. The incrementalism problem is in this way somewhat smaller than might first appear 
because, as the problem looms larger, disparate interests will be more inclined to form coalitions 
at earlier stages. 
It is, however, implausible that this homeostatic device is so remarkable as to match the 
problem itself. Owners face transaction costs and a variety of collective action problems that 
make the divide-and-conquer metaphor seem appropriate. A large invading army, A, surely 
prefers to face two unrelated opponents, B and C, rather than one large opponent, D, that is as 
powerful as B and C perfectly combined. There will be many cases where A can battle B and 
then turn its full might on C, often with assistance from the remnants of B, much as the 
commercial property owners might eventually favor the law’s extension to other properties. At 
best, B and C will sometimes form a defensive alliance, but that makes A no worse off than it 
would be with D as an opponent. 
 
C. Reversibility by Compensation 
 
 No regulation is entirely irreversible because subsequent law can require retroactive 
compensation to one who paid to fulfill an unfunded mandate. I call this retroactive 
compensation, though that expression seems unnecessarily duplicative, to distinguish it from 
compensation that is promised in advance. One who has property taken by the government is 
compensated;17 one who incurs costs by way of regulation might be retroactively compensated, 
in whole or in part, either because the government might choose to pay or because a legal regime 
might provide for compensation for the loss incurred in step one if and only if some other legal 
step is taken at step two. Compensation for government takings does not normally depend on 
results in subsequent legal steps. Thus, our commercial property owners might eventually join a 
coalition opposed to requiring ramps in all residential buildings, if that coalition agrees that it 
will press for a bill requiring retrofitting only when the government is willing to pay the costs of 
modification-–with a requirement that the government pay the costs for accommodations 
mandated and retrofitted during the past several years. 
Legislative bundling of this kind appears to negate the role assigned to irreversibility. It 
does not undo the social loss from building ramps that would not have survived cost-benefit 
analysis, but it is the private cost and not the social loss that affects owners’ willingness to join in 
the political power struggle. The prospect of retroactive compensation might cause a previous 
loser to join a defensive coalition. If so, the smoking ban and access ramp cases are close 
relatives. It is immediately apparent that compensation must play an important role in further 
discussion of the incrementalism problem and then again in Part III, where the focus is on power 
politics, or the notion of pitting organized interests against one another. 
 Reversibility by compensation seems like a promising means of eliminating or at least 
reducing the incrementalism problem. It avoids the larger question of why we do not have a rule 
                                                 
17 See U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”). 
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that all burdensome regulations come with compensation.18 Virtually all legal systems provide 
for something like fair-market-value compensation for the complete taking of private property 
for public use, but not one constitutionalizes or legislates compensation for the burdens 
accompanying mundane regulations even when they fall on a narrow set of people or entities. 
Compensable regulatory takings are rare everywhere, perhaps because of valuation difficulties, 
because it is too difficult to tax or otherwise raise money from those who benefit from 
regulation, and because it is too difficult to establish a baseline from which such takings are 
measured.19 Still, it is worth noting that if all regulatory burdens were compensated, or simply all 
that were not means of combating criminality or negligence or nuisance, there would be no 
incrementalism problem of the kind described here because there would be no reason for a 
property owner to object to socially efficient regulations.20 Although reversibility by 
compensation can be seen as a selective application of a broader takings law, its purpose is very 
different from that normally found in the takings literature. There the idea is to protect 
investments in private property, encourage only efficient government interventions, diminish the 
incentive to engage in political activity at the expense of dispersed interests or single owners, and 
perhaps provide insurance to losers; here the notion is to prevent and reverse inefficient 
regulations by giving those who were once burdened reason to join coalitions that might block 
further, presumably inefficient, regulation. This is, of course an optimistic view. It might be that 
the regulation undertaken in the first step was efficient, and that now the promise of 
compensation generates a coalition that not only defeats incremental regulation, but also reverses 
the earlier, desirable law. In any event, the law of takings is more a reference point than a source 
of real law for the issues explored here. Among other things, incrementalism may be a problem 
where there is no “property” right at issue, so reversibility by compensation is independent of 
takings law. 
 For reversibility by compensation to work, potential political allies must know that it will 
be forthcoming. But retroactive compensation is hardly a constitutional right and, though it 
might be promised in a bargain, there is no way to enforce that bargain. An association of 
                                                 
18 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 57 
(1985)(“[C]ompensation must be paid . . . Let the government remove any of the incidents of ownership, let it 
diminish the rights of the owner in any fashion . . . no matter how small the alteration and no matter how general its 
application.”).  
19 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 
Cal. L. Rev. 569 (1984) (stating that the judicial approach to regulatory takings is unsatisfactory, and proposing an 
approach based purely on maximizing economic efficiency in which the government can be said to supply otherwise 
unavailable insurance through ex post compensation); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 1393 (1990-1991) (stressing the need to identify a “neutral baseline” in takings cases so that courts 
may evaluate regulation “against a reference point that is not provided by the regulators themselves . . . [nor] upon a 
method for evaluating regulatory goals that is more than merely the courts’ own judgment concerning the wisdom of 
the regulation.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. Envtl L.J. 110 (2002-
2003) (“When one examines American compensation law . . . one finds that . . . there is little guidance about how to 
measure just compensation in regulatory takings.”). 
20 Incrementalism could be a problem because voters, now burdened not only by inefficient regulations but also 
by the financial responsibility of compensation, might pay more attention to drastic changes than to small ones, and 
advocates might thus slide things past voters by proceeding incrementally. But this is a different kind of 
incrementalism problem. 
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storeowners may gain an alliance with owners of commercial properties, who lost in the previous 
step, by promising to push for compensation even as they forestall further regulation, but the 
storeowners might back out or relax their efforts in the face of compromise legislation which 
proposes to exempt singly owned stores but does not offer compensation to those who had earlier 
been forced to invest in ramps. The owners of commercial buildings may not be able to observe 
the effort expended by their coalition partners and, in any event, the coalition between these 
nonrepeat players is likely to be unstable.  
 When the promise to gain retroactive compensation is not credible, the parties might 
agree to enforceable contracts. The targets of the second step of regulation might simply promise 
by contract to indemnify the losers in the first step for the cost of the political campaign or, more 
remarkably, for the cost of earlier compliance, such as the ramps previously required and 
installed. Alternatively, they may promise to pay only if they succeed in halting the 
incrementalist attack but do not gain retroactive compensation from the government. These are 
risky contracts for the storeowners to sign because they remove the incentive for aggressive 
political action on the part of the already regulated party. A better contract might provide for 
partial compensation so that all the parties have reason to push for the results that they 
respectively seek. The example assumes that it is most unlikely that legislation will compensate 
for the old burdens and mandate but not compensate for the step-two regulation, though that risk 
could also be minimized through contract. 
 I have hardly exhausted the possibilities here, but it is clear that the problem of 
incrementalism is greater, though not insoluble, where early-stage compliance involves 
irretrievable investments. And it is useful to repeat that whatever the level of irreversibility, the 
incrementalism problem is a possibility and not a fact. If it be efficient (or right or fair) to ban 
smoking everywhere, then we should celebrate the ability of advocates to get us close to that 
optimum by taking on interest groups one at a time. If reversibility by compensation is 
intriguing, it is because this compensation does not undo socially efficient regulation.  
 
II. Learning on the Slopes 
 
 An obvious and important argument for incremental change, whether by legislation, 
judicial decision, or regulation, is that we often learn from experience. Lawmakers, and even the 
most avid proponents of drug legalization, might think it wise to begin with the legalization of 
marijuana alone in order to assess substitution effects, use by minors, and other consequences of 
legalization. An incremental approach might overcome political opposition, but a secondary, 
expected benefit is that the design of a second step is likely to reflect lessons learned from the 
first. A familiar pair, or entanglement, begins with a claim by opponents of a regulation that a 
given proposal starts down a slippery slope toward an endpoint that most citizens or legislators 
would regard as abhorrent. There will be cases, real or imagined, where the first step will indeed 
lead eventually to this endpoint because of intransitivity, political exhaustion, coordination 
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problems, or adherence to precedent.21 In turn, advocates for the proposed regulation might say, 
first, that every good law occupies a compromise position between unattractive extremes, so that 
mention of the slippery slope and its endpoint is a mere scare tactic and, second, that there is 
learning from experience on the slope itself. We may not know at the outset where the social 
optimum is located, but it is normally sensible to gather information and then reevaluate the 
likely costs and benefits of further regulation (or deregulation). As we will see, irreversibility 
also plays a role in this argument. Lost in all this is the idea that the value of experimentation 
does not necessarily translate into a good argument for learning through incrementalism. 
 Consider a favorite example of the slippery slopers, gun control. Advocates of gun 
control might favor a first step of registration and licensing, but their opponents raise the specter 
of the slippery slope and argue, among other things, that registration will make complete 
confiscation easier.22 Confiscation of all firearms in the hands of private citizens is anathema to 
most audiences. Advocates claim that easy ownership of assault weapons and pocket-size 
handguns cannot possible survive cost-benefit analyses; opponents disagree and may intuit that 
every step down the slope weakens the likely configuration of defenders ready to halt the next 
step on the path to confiscation. Advocates might also claim that a jurisdiction will learn a good 
deal from regulation. If licensing or a ban on assault weapons is associated with a dramatic 
reduction in violent crime, then there may be more support for further restrictions; if licensing 
leads to a serious increase in home burglaries and firearm theft, then a case might be made for 
requiring firearms to be kept under lock and key. Most businesses and individuals engage in a 
kind of search, or experimental process, before committing to major changes, and there is every 
reason to think that governments ought to do the same. 
 In principle, advocates might respond to the argument about learning-from-regulation 
with a promise, however unenforceable, that if a ban on fully automatic weapons, say, does not 
produce an x percent improvement in some stated measure, then they will forswear a ban on 
semi-automatic weapons and indeed might agree to rescind the first step, which is to say the ban 
on fully automatic weapons. The promise might be slightly more convincing if the experimental 
ban is legislated with a sunset provision. Similarly, a ban on smoking in bars is opposed, in part, 
by bar owners who fear a reduction in patronage, and who claim more generally that tourism and 
convention business will wilt. Advocates who argued that a substantial health gain could be 
enjoyed at low cost might agree to rescind the ban if alcohol sales or the hotel occupancy rate 
dropped by more than five percent. One way to think about or advance the rescission promise is 
                                                 
21 For a catalogue of path-dependent accounts, see Volokh, supra note 9, at 1033-34 & 1051-52. Volokh tells 
several stories in which small incremental steps may lead to larger regulations, initially undesired. For example, the 
effects of gun registration might appear to be too small to merit a defense, but small steps may nevertheless 
aggregate to regulation that would have been highly objectionable. Registration might create political momentum on 
the side of gun control. Registration might reconfigure the opposition to gun control, if fewer people own guns as a 
result. Registration may lower the cost of confiscation, which could have been a principal point of opposition to 
confiscation for many people. Implementing confiscation might become constitutional where it previously was not, 
because the registration system can provide probable cause to search the houses of all registered gun owners. Id. at 
1033-34. 
22 Id. 
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to recognize that if the health benefits could eventually be shown to exceed those projected by 
the advocates, it is almost certain that a subsequent step and wider ban would be proposed. 
 The absence of such promises might reflect their unenforceability, but it might also 
suggest that learning-from-regulation is largely a rhetorical device. Very few advocates suggest 
sunset provisions or agree at the outset that if the benefits of a regulation fall short of some stated 
expectation, then the law ought to be revoked. Perhaps this is because data rarely influence the 
most passionate advocates or interest groups, whose positions usually reflect very strong 
preferences rather than the likely efficient position for the population at large. If a local ban on 
smoking in bars produces a dramatic decrease in patronage and tax revenues from alcohol sales, 
then advocates of the ban are unlikely to apologize and say that their cost-benefit claims were 
wrong. They might believe that smokers moved to outdoor cafes or other unregulated locations, 
and propose that the ban ought to be extended to new venues. Owners of bars do not internalize 
the nation’s health care costs, and the American Medical Association–-a surprisingly late-
arriving advocate for smoking bans23–-does not take responsibility for local tax revenues or the 
profits of tavern keepers.24  
 Learning-from-regulation sometimes suggests careful experimentation rather than legal 
incrementalism. Indeed, the idea that states might be laboratories suggests not so much 
incrementalism as somewhat controlled, dramatic experiments. In the case of access ramps, it 
would be useful to have data about frequency of use and about the impact of ramps on workforce 
participation by disabled persons. A structured experiment might do this best. But, again, data 
matter more to agnostic citizens and nonpartisan lawmakers than to passionate advocates. If there 
were no significant workforce effect, then advocates might note the importance of more 
accessible public transportation in bringing disabled employees to accommodating workplaces.  
 In other settings, drastic changes might teach more than incremental ones. A single 
month or year in which smoking was banned everywhere in one jurisdiction, in all eating and 
lodging establishments there, or in all places on a rotating basis might yield useful data. 
Learning-from-regulation is a good argument for change and experimentation, but it is not 
always, or even often, an argument for incremental change, especially where incrementalism 
operates on the legal system as a whole rather than with the idea of using one or two jurisdictions 
as proving grounds.25 
 Learning-through-incrementalism seems most likely where the social or political 
optimum is widely understood to be in a specified range so that there is little support for either 
endpoint of what might otherwise be a slippery slope. Consider cases of minimum-age 
                                                 
23 See Alan Blum & Howard Wolinsky, AMA Rewrites Tobacco History, 346 Lancet 261 (1995) (“Today’s 
AMA should be commended for attempting to tackle the tobacco pandemic. But it should be 
remembered that this organisation is a latecomer to the 
war.”).. 
24 Both groups might care about the health of employees in bars and restaurants, but these employees might self-
select. It is interesting that neither side produces evidence of the sentiments of the employees.  
25 See Listokin, supra note 1, at 483, 533-38 (describing the value of high-variance experiments, especially 
when they are reversible). But reversibility in that work is not limited to compliance costs, and is not at all focused 
on its role in creating or blocking political coalitions. 
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regulation. Countries differ as to the minimum ages for drinking (alcohol), driving, voting, and 
other rights and privileges; but, apart from a few reconstructed prohibitionists, no one seriously 
espouses that these minima be in the thirties or forties. Incrementalism thus seems like the way 
to discover the “right” age at which one might be permitted to purchase alcoholic beverages. But 
here, too, partisans will disagree about the lessons to be drawn from experience. Imagine that 
advocates succeed in legislating a drinking age of nineteen, where it had previously been 
eighteen, with the claim that a higher age will reduce fatal automobile accidents, inasmuch as 
many of those are associated with alcohol consumption. If the new drinking age does not then 
bring about a substantial decrease in fatalities, advocates might say that nineteen-year- olds 
purchased alcoholic beverages for their younger friends and classmates, or perhaps that cashiers 
and bartenders misconstrued eighteen-year-olds to be older patrons. Advocates will agitate for a 
higher drinking age of twenty or twenty-one, with the conviction that the new restriction will 
reduce accidents. Of course, every categorical removal of drinkers–-or drivers–-will reduce the 
number of unwanted drivers. It might be that a ban on drinking applied to everyone under 
eighteen and then to twenty-five-year-olds as well would reduce fatalities as much as a 
prohibition attached to everyone under nineteen. Moreover, a cost-benefit driven policy would 
consider driving ages as well as drinking ages, though the private and social cost of an 
incrementally higher driving age will strike most lawmakers as greater than the cost of a year 
without alcohol. The latter is especially difficult to quantify. In any event, advocates rarely seem 
interested in experiments that would illuminate cost-benefit calculations of this kind. Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving (MADD) is likely to attach little value to the utility some people get from 
drinking. Similarly, McDonalds employs many high-school students and sells food to a young 
audience; it benefits from a low driving age and is unlikely to internalize the benefits of higher 
driving ages as it wields its political power. 
 Then there is the more obvious possibility that the learning-from-regulation will be that a 
drinking age of nineteen rather than eighteen does indeed significantly decrease fatalities. If so, 
there will be pressure to raise the age further to twenty, and so on, until the returns from doing so 
seem modest. If there were no evidence of a declining return as the age was increased, 
lawmakers might return to the minimum age of eighteen, or even try seventeen because of 
interest group pressure, and the rhetoric or heartfelt argument would include the point that it is 
unfair to restrict the freedom of eighteen-year-olds when the benefit is no greater than doing the 
same for other ages. Lawmakers may simply look for some political equilibrium where no 
organized interest has an enormous stake in the result. If so, this is a case where the learning-
from-regulation argument offers significant support for incrementalism, though perhaps not for 
reasons normally contemplated. 
 In sum, useful experiments come in disparate sizes, in the sense that one does not always 
wish for a variable to move in small steps. The argument for limiting law to modest experiments 
must be based on asymmetrical error costs or irreversibility. But this is not the place for a full 
exploration of the distribution of error costs or for a conclusion as to when incrementalism is the 
best means of experimentation. Incrementalism has been lauded with no specification as to 
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exactly where it is desirable. My aim is simply to show that incrementalism comes with baggage, 
and that the baggage is heaviest where there is irreversibility. We can now add the observation 
that larger, dramatic changes do not necessarily impose greater and more irreversible costs, 
because useful experiments come in several sizes. 
 
III. Compensation and Interest Group Politics 
 
A. Undercompensation and Overcompensation  
 
 The discussion in Part I emphasized the importance of irreversibility in understanding the 
problem with incrementalism. If irreversible costs were imposed on one interest group in step 
one, then that group would have no reason to join in a common defense against further regulation 
in step two. Indeed, it might favor the regulation of its competitors in step two, either to raise 
their marginal costs or drive some out of business. But it was suggested that seemingly 
irreversible regulations could indeed be reversed, at least from the perspective of the directly 
burdened party, if compensation were retroactively provided. If a property owner must retrofit a 
building with an access ramp costing $300,000, and the ramp brings in new business with a 
present value of $50,000, then compensation of $250,000 will leave the owner as well off as 
before. Even if competing owners are not required to construct ramps, there will be neither envy 
nor competitive disadvantage in either direction. This compensation could be provided in step 
one, but that is the stuff of a very broad takings law, or it could be offered as part of a legislative 
package in step two. Compensation could come from the interest group at risk in step two, when 
that group seeks a defensive alliance, or it could come about because the allied groups push the 
government to provide retroactive compensation. Either way, the prospect of compensation 
might encourage a burdened party to join forces in opposing further regulation. If the 
government, or an advocacy group, is thus stopped in its incrementalist path, we might say, or 
wish, that the advocates (and more passive government constituents if they bear the financial 
burden of compensation) are penalized for pushing too far past the social optimum, and are thus 
perhaps deterred from overreaching with their strategic incrementalism. A more straightforward 
idea was that interest groups that were once divided are now encouraged to form the alliance 
they ought to have formed in the first place in order to defend against the overachieving 
advocates.  
 These perspectives are overly simplistic. The possibility of compensation complicates 
everything about incrementalism, the political process, and lawmaking. In this Part, the focus is 
first on political process, and especially power politics involving interest groups, where the 
larger question is the rules of engagement that are most likely to produce good laws. If there is 
an incrementalism problem, and if compensation is part of the solution needed to align interest 
groups in a way that produces good law, then the important question is when to provide 
compensation and whether to do so in discretionary or mandatory fashion. In time, the discussion 
looks not at power politics but rather at the question of inefficiency, or rent-seeking, which is to 
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say resource-consuming activity undertaken to gain a profit or government-sponsored advantage. 
At times the analysis tracks that which is appropriate to a discussion of takings law or 
retroactivity or both; the novelty of the discussion here is preserved by focusing on the case for 
and against incrementalism. 
 In the interest of reducing the number of balls in the air, I adhere to the remarkably and 
absurdly simplifying assumption that compensation will be correctly calculated. If this be not so, 
then incrementalism is but a small problem in a larger, distressing picture of government 
regulation and takings. When compensation is known to be ungenerous, affected parties can be 
expected to litigate and lobby to avoid having property or business interests regulated or 
condemned; if voluntary purchases by the government, in the shadow of expected regulation or 
eminent domain proceedings, are also ungenerous, then private property owners will expend 
resources to forestall government projects. On the other hand, where compensation in excess of 
the private owner’s valuation is expected, there will be a push to have one’s property taken, or 
one’s business regulated–-if the regulation is severe enough that it amounts to a compensable 
taking. At the same time, if payments required of the government affect its inclination or ability 
to regulate or undertake projects (as will surely be the case if the beneficiary of the government’s 
action is made to pay in one form or another), then we can expect a reduction in interventions. 
Correspondingly, if the government can capture gains from beneficiaries while it 
undercompensates losers, we can expect more intervention, unless the losers who could not 
extract more compensation are somehow relatively adept at blocking the government’s 
interventions. All this complexity can be avoided with the assumption of accurate compensation. 
 Unfortunately, much complexity remains. Compensation may be perfect, or even 
generous, but a property owner will recognize that she is sometimes better off if the government 
regulates or takes the property of others and allows her property to flourish because of the new 
government project or regulation. In these cases, we must again be anxious about the incentives 
to encourage or discourage government interventions, and to craft them one way or the other. 
And then from the government’s perspective, even if compensation were perfectly calculated, 
there will always be budget constraints and governments usually cannot collect from those who 
will benefit from the legal intervention. Though I try also to set these considerations aside, 
because they are associated with all government interventions rather than solely those that reflect 
incrementalism, they come into play when compensation is an ingredient in a suggested antidote 
to the incrementalism problem. 
 
B. Power Politics 
 
 Thus far, compensation has been used to undo irreversibility and, in turn, to reduce the 
incrementalism problem. It can, however, play a more important role if we make assumptions 
about the desirable constellation of interest groups. A starting point of public choice theory is 
that a well-organized interest group is likely to overachieve at the expense of dispersed interests, 
or losers. The academic literature emphasizes the obvious problem of a group’s gaining too 
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much of something;26 there is, however, an additional problem with regard to the form of 
government activity. For example, it is not simply that the military budget will be larger because 
of the efforts of well-organized contractors, but also that it is likely to be organized around 
particular pieces of new equipment or military bases that benefit particular interests but may be 
suboptimal.  
 A suggested antidote to this process problem is to set well-matched interest groups 
against one another.27 For example, if teachers’ salaries were to be funded by a tax on milk, or 
milk subsidies required a reduction in the education budget, or perhaps both, then dairy farmers 
and public school teachers might lobby and even present useful information to the legislature. A 
fair fight might allow unattached legislators to resolve the matter in the public’s interest. A 
skeptic might wonder why interest groups would abide by the rules of battle, inasmuch as they 
can be altered by legislation. And then there is also the question of why well-matched opponents 
should be expected to leave a desirable result on the battlefield. But a guarded optimist could 
think that there will be pressure to abide by the rule of well-matched opponents, and that the 
outcome of such a battle is likely to be superior to one in which either organized interest was 
able to operate at the expense of a dispersed, disorganized interest. A true optimist might look to 
campaign finance reform, education, and a free press to make interest group activity useless 
when not directed toward helping the polity find socially desirable outcomes, but a pragmatic 
optimist is prepared to look for a second-best power politics process. Finally, another interesting 
possibility is that it is easier for voters or public-spirited lawmakers to assess the strength of 
interest groups than it is to locate social optima more directly. Even an enlightened lawmaker 
may be unsure where to ban smoking; the same lawmaker may do well to leave it to associations 
representing owners of different kinds of establishments and to the American Cancer Society to 
bargain for the “optimal” ban or to battle for votes in one City Council after another in order to 
set the rules. The case for arranged battle is not unlike that in favor of the adversary system in 
litigation.   
 With this in mind, we can revisit the history of smoking bans. Advocates may not have 
been terribly well organized when they began investing in political activity, but an early target 
was airline cabins where the opposition was dispersed, though perhaps no more so than the 
advocates.28 Following a period during which airlines agreed to no-smoking sections, legislation 
proceeded incrementally over the course of a decade, first by prohibiting smoking on domestic 
flights of under two hours, then on those shorter than six hours, and then on all domestic 
flights.29 The airlines had little reason to fight these bans because smokers could not migrate to 
unregulated close substitutes. At the local level, smoking bans did not follow a single path, but a 
                                                 
26 See William N. Eskridge, et. al., Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public 
Policy 57 (4th ed. 2007) (charting the costs and benefits of various legislative processes); Maxwell Stearns & Todd 
Zywicki, Public Choice Concepts and Applications in Law 251-54 (2009) (discussing the “demand side” of 
legislative goods). 
27 See Tullock, supra note 3. 
28 See Steven A. Mirmina, Aviation Safety and Security - Legal Developments, 63 J. Air L. & Com. 547, 558-
59 (1998). 
29 See id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 417063 (2006) (banning, in 2000, smoking on all domestic flights). 
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ban on pipes and cigars in some venues was followed by a more complete ban on smoking in 
restaurants, which was often followed by a proposal to extend the ban to bars, then to hotels, then 
to parks and beaches in some jurisdictions, and, in several jurisdictions, to all indoor places 
except private residences.30 In some jurisdictions bans began with office buildings, where 
second-hand smoke was seen as a matter of employment conditions, and there again the losers 
would have been dispersed employees, not championed by any organized business interest.31 An 
idealist might say that, in incrementalist fashion, law found its way to the social optimum, which 
varies across disparate jurisdictions. An optimistic public choice theorist might say that although 
we are uncertain of the optimal intervention, at least similarly empowered interest groups were 
eventually pitted against one another and, apparently, equilibrium was reached. We might think 
of this as politically optimal, or at least as reflecting the best we can expect of power politics in 
the real world. 
 I return now to the idea of reversal through compensation, and imagine again that 
restaurant owners lose on their own in step one but then bar owners, when threatened in step two, 
induce restaurant owners, and perhaps unregulated hotel owners as well, to join in the defense. 
The coalition succeeds, in this hypothetical, in preserving smoke-friendly drinking 
establishments and also in reversing the ban on smoking in restaurants. Indeed, this reversal was 
“promised” to the restaurant owners as the reward for their participation in this round of power 
politics. If the reversal seems implausible, consider the reversal of regulations regarding 
motorcycle helmets in some states, the increase in highway speed limits after they were reduced, 
and the volatility of depreciation schedules in the Internal Revenue Code;32 reversals are not 
                                                 
30 California, for example, pursued aggressive regulation of smoking in public places. It passed the Smoke-Free 
Act in 1994, prohibiting smoking in all places of employment. Cal Lab Code § 6404.5 (1994). California’s cities 
can and have passed yet more stringent local laws. The city of Calabasas, for example, prohibits smoking in all 
indoor and outdoor areas of the city, except for a handful of designated smoking areas. Calabasas Code § 8.12 
(2009), available at http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=16235&sid=5. 
31 See N.Y. Pub Health Law § 1399-O (banning smoking in all enclosed workplaces). The present law, 
however, exempts (1) private homes and automobiles, (2) hotel and motel rooms, (3) retail tobacco businesses, (4) 
private clubs, (5) cigar bars, (6) outdoor areas of restaurants and bars, and (7) enclosed rooms in restaurants, bars, 
convention halls, etc., when hosting private functions organized for the promotion and sampling of tobacco 
products. This law amended the prior law, which in 2003 had banned smoking in most indoor areas open to the 
public.  
32 See, e.g., FL ST 316.211(3)(b) (“. . . a person over 21 years of age may operate or ride upon a motorcycle 
without wearing protective headgear securely fastened upon his or her head if such person is covered by an 
insurance policy providing for at least $10,000 in medical benefits for injuries incurred as a result of a crash while 
operating or riding on a motorcycle.”) This section amended the prior Florida law, which had required all 
motorcyclists to wear protective headgear. At the federal level, states were required to lower their highway speed 
limits to 55 miles per hour in order to receive certain federal funds. 23 U.S.C. §154. Repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-
59, § 205 (1996). 
  The law was modified by Congress in the late 1980s to increase the limit on certain roads, but then repealed 
in 1995, returning the issue completely to the states. Since that time many states have raised their speed limits, 
though uniformity is still lacking. For example, the current speed limit on interstate highways in Idaho is 75 miles 
per hour. ID ST 49-654. In Illinois the limit is 65 miles per hour. 625 ILCS 5/11-601. See Robert E. King & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 155 (1999) (tracing the history of speeding laws in the 
United States, including the brief flirtation by the federal government with uniformly regulating speed limits 
nationwide). 
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terribly uncommon, especially if we think of deregulation as reversal. If restaurant smoking were 
to be permitted once more, then one might argue that it had become apparent that the earlier ban 
on smoking in restaurants was the product of a divide-and-conquer strategy, eventually revealed 
to have been an instance of the incrementalism problem.33  
 Reversal through compensation, or compensation in the event of regulatory reversal, can 
be justified by thinking about behavior in the shadow of retroactive lawmaking. For example, 
following a tightening of pollution laws, there is the provocative argument that polluters can be 
encouraged to anticipate (rather than battle) more demanding environmental laws by holding 
them liable for injuries that would have been avoided had they abided by the standards 
subsequently set. Similarly, advocates of smoking bans-–though much harder to identify than 
emitters of particular pollutants–-should perhaps compensate the restaurant owners if the ban is 
reversed. The argument will seem a strange one, especially because its logic also suggests that 
when the same smoking ban was first instituted, the restaurant owners should themselves have 
owed damages for failing to ban smoking in the years prior to the ban, limited only by the statute 
of limitations.34 Both applications of the logic suffer from the problem of identifying who, 
exactly, ought to pay. But this is not the place to puzzle over the literature on retroactivity, and I 
prefer instead to emphasize that selective compensation might continue to be favored on the 
instrumentalist ground that it encourages the earlier losers, here the restaurant owners, to form a 
coalition with those later threatened, here the bar owners, exactly as they might have done in the 
earlier time period except that a collective action problem or a misapprehension about the path of 
regulation interfered. 
 If mandatory compensation for regulatory reversals can improve power politics, there is 
the question of whether it is feasible. Law has struggled with the question of how to define and 
compensate regulatory takings, and it has struggled with rules that might be regarded as 
arbitrary.35 Compensation for burdensome regulations only if reversed, or only for those reversed 
                                                 
33 Note that this reversal by compensation strategy is applied here even though the smoking ban, unlike a ramp 
requirement, does not represent an irreversible investment. 
34 If this argument is fashioned as a takings claim, then we need some baseline understanding of property rights 
and smoking rights. As a torts claim, it is unconvincing because the primary wrongdoers are the smokers (or tobacco 
companies) and not the owners of facilities in which second-hand smoke is experienced. Still, there remains the idea 
developed in the retroactivity, or legal transitions, literature that retroactive liability will discourage parties with 
superior information about desirable legal change from lobbying and otherwise working against improvements in 
law. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 551-52 (1986) 
(showing that transition rules, including retroactivity, can enforce the legal system’s goals); Saul Levmore, Changes, 
Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 Colum. L. Rev 1657, 1658-59 (1999) (continuing the argument that parties with 
information can be encouraged to anticipate legal change through retroactive liability and other means). A major 
problem with this argument is that it raises the stakes associated with change and might actually lead interest groups 
to block progress rather than accelerate it. 
Note that the description in the text passes over the puzzle of why choice was so rarely offered in the absence of 
legal intervention. Why, in other words, are nonsmokers so powerful politically and yet so weak in the marketplace 
that they could rarely be satisfied by entrepreneurs who sorted them by offering nonsmoking environments? 
35 Thus,  
The question of what constitutes a “taking” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a 
problem of considerable difficulty. While this Court has recognized that the Fifth Amendment's guarantee 
is designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness 
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after subsequent, incrementally more severe regulations are voted on, presents considerable 
difficulties. No legal system calculates and awards damages arising out of a regulation like a 
smoking ban, where there is a safety claim and where net losses to restaurateurs and other 
property owners are difficult to assess. Similarly, the burden of gun registration or the private 
cost of a prohibition on small handguns or assault weapons is difficult to calculate. The net 
losses of an age cohort that was “wrongly” denied the right to engage in an activity are even 
more difficult to calculate. The compensation solution to the problem of incrementalism seems 
feasible only for a subset of cases, and it is not a subset particularly rich in reversals. 
 Moreover, the feasibility issue is not limited to damage assessments. There are significant 
difficulties in identifying reversals of prior policies. A freeze in the minimum wage, despite 
inflation, might be a reversal. Many changes in tax law, including changes in rates and in 
depreciation schedules necessarily reverse prior law. A regulatory regime requiring elevators 
rather than access ramps might be deemed a regulatory reversal by some and a further step in the 
regulatory trajectory by others. The problem is real as well as pecuniary because interest groups 
will have reason to tweak legislation in order to create a regulatory reversal where they would 
not otherwise have wanted one or, on the other side, to frame legislation so that it is not deemed 
a reversal in order to avoid the compensation requirement. Thus, lawmakers required passive 
restraint systems in automobiles on the way to requiring airbags. Once airbags were required, 
auto-engaging seatbelts were no longer mandatory. If this were to be regarded as a reversal, so 
that compensation for the passive-restraint step were required, then the airbag legislation might 
have taken a less efficient form in order to avoid the compensation requirement.36 
 Finally, in many cases the problem of identifying regulatory reversals and that of 
measuring damages run together and make the compensation solution infeasible. Licensing 
requirements in any profession may become incrementally more burdensome, and yet each new 
burden also raises the barrier to new competitors. Clients might be the group most deserving of 
compensation, but we do not think of them as implicated in the divide-and-conquer problem. 
 In short, compensation is in theory a tool with which to alleviate the incrementalism 
problem, especially where there is apparent irreversibility, but once we move away from the 
easiest cases it is as difficult to identify regulatory reversals, and also to assess net damages, as it 
                                                                                                                                                             
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole, this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop 
any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by 
public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a 
few persons.  
Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 at 123 (1978) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted).  
And as for the rules themselves, there is, for example, the permanent physical presence test articulated in 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Under this rule a takings will be found if the 
governmental action imposes a permanent physical occupation of property, irrespective of whether the regulation 
affects a public policy benefit or the regulation has only a minor economic impact on the property owner. Similarly, 
there is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), holding that a takings may be found when 
the State deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial use of the land.  
36 The law might have given manufacturers a choice, though airbags were superior and though bifurcation might 
have sacrificed some economies of scale. 
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is to pinpoint problems with incrementalism. A respectable case can surely be made for 
compensation following regulatory reversals–-with an eye on getting the power politics right in 
the first place–-as it is comparable to the argument for compensation for all apparent regulatory 
takings. But the argument is almost surely too complicated, execution is too difficult, and there 
remains the question of whether compensation ought to be paid by taxpayers (in which case there 
will likely be insufficient opposition to a regulatory reversal), by advocates (past or present), or 
by previous beneficiaries. Compensation might in theory solve the incrementalism problem, but 
it is a theory unlikely to translate into practice.  
 
C. Discretionary Compensation and Unproblematic Minimum Age Legislation 
 
 Nothing stops the political process, including bargaining among interest groups, from 
producing compensation for some regulatory reversals. Just as a government sometimes buys 
property rights when it could have achieved its ends by regulating without paying compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment, so too, as we have assumed, a government, or another interest 
group, can compensate ramp-builders or other earlier losers even though it need not do so. It is 
unusual for a government to pay for past compliance with its rules, but not so unusual for it to 
pay for new regulations–-especially because it can normally substitute direct activity for 
mandates. Thus, the government can provide air marshals on commercial airline flights, or it can 
require airlines to provide certified security personnel. It can require airlines to provide the seats 
for these marshals, or it can advance the cause of security and the economic health of the airlines 
by buying tickets for the marshals. A government that requires airbags, smoke alarms, or 
vaccinations can presumably offer to supply them. This point about discretionary compensation 
will seem more plausible if the likelihood of payment through a kind of logroll is included in the 
calculus. A government might require airbags at the automakers’ expense, but it might in the 
same legislative breath, or session, buy more vehicles than expected for its own fleet. Moreover, 
the government might change the tax law regarding operating loss carryovers in a way that 
benefits these losers. In any event, there are good, if counterintuitive, reasons for unfunded 
mandates, especially where powerful interest groups are concerned.37  
  It is noteworthy that our experience with discretionary compensation is consistent with 
the thinking offered here on troubling incrementalism. Following an increase in the drinking age, 
no political system is likely to compensate those who must now wait longer to drink. 
Interestingly, step-by-step changes with respect to such minimum age rules are free from the 
                                                 
37 See Julie Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other Regulations, 93 Nw. L. Rev. 351, 354 
(1999) (examining the positive attributes of unfunded mandates). An important feature of Professor Roin’s 
discussion is the political power of states (and localities). See id. at 378 (“State and local governments, or the 
interests that they tax or service, may balance or offset those interest groups that stand to gain from 
intergovernmental mandates.). In particular, she focuses on their ability to form coalitions as repeat players and to 
organize in the halls of Congress. See id. at 379 (“Indeed these subordinate governments might lobby for funded--or, 
of course, overfunded--mandates when there is some political gain to a claim that the federal government forced 
certain policies on the states or polities . . . .”). This power might explain why the incrementalism problem does not 
often arise by dividing and conquering jurisdictions. 
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incrementalism problem. That no one-–even among those who think they can distinguish 
derisible slippery slopes from necessary compromise among interests and values-–regards 
minimum age legislation as played out on a slippery slope is perhaps a clue rather than an 
oversight. Minimum age legislation is likely free of the incrementalism problem because it does 
not divide and conquer defending groups. Advocates did succeed in raising the minimum 
drinking age from eighteen to nineteen, then nineteen to twenty, and then to twenty-one.38 But 
there are a few reasons why this is different from incremental building code changes and 
smoking bans. First, a single age cohort is generally not a well-organized political interest.39 
Second, to the extent that other interest groups are organized and serve as proxies for others, 
such as bar owners serving as proxies for eighteen-year olds who wish to drink, these other 
interests are not divisible. After all, no identifiable set of taverns specializes in serving 18-year 
olds, and no bar owners would be expected to turn, in a second regulatory step, against other bars 
able to serve 19-year olds. To the extent that vendors of alcohol are the organized interest in 
play, minimum age legislation does not present an incrementalism problem because the relevant 
interest group is not divisible in the manner of restaurants and bars, or owners of new buildings 
and old buildings.  
 There is a third and final reason why minimum age legislation, though historically 
incrementalist, does not run into the incrementalism problem. Even if we think of each age 
cohort as an interest group, their disorganization could be overcome at the polls if each cohort 
had millions of voters likely to take their drinking rights seriously. If citizens born in 1960 found 
in 1979 that they would have to wait another year to purchase drinks, they might have been 
expected to seek revenge against legislators who raised the minimum age, especially if the age 
had been raised more than once at the cohort’s expense. In fact, legislators enacted multiple, 
staggered increases in the minimum drinking age in one step, and postponed effective dates so 
that those old enough to vote had no objection.40 In short, although a young cohort might wish it 
had worked against a series of changes long before it attained voting age, there was not another 
cohort from which it could have been divided and conquered—and certainly not another that 
would have been expected to turn on it once itself regulated. The incrementalism problem thus 
                                                 
38 Wisconsin, for example, lowered its drinking age in 1971 to 18 years of age. Prior to that time the drinking 
age had been 21 for all wine and spirits. It was raised to 19 in 1984, and to 21 in 1986. See W.S.A. 125.02(8m). 
39 I leave aside a hypothetical assault on sixty-five-year olds, who might be well represented by the AARP. 
40 Even in those states with the most frequent changes, there has not been a progression that looks like a divide-
and-conquer strategy. Thus, Georgia legislated twenty-one as the minimum age for purchasing alcohol after 
Prohibition in 1933; in 1972, it lowered the age to eighteen (this was a period in which drinking ages and voting 
ages dropped to conform to the age for military conscription); in 1980, Georgia again raised the drinking age to 
nineteen; finally, in 1985, Georgia raised the age to twenty-one (to take effect in 1986) in anticipation of a federal 
regulation. The minimum age was set at twenty for the 1985 transition year. Effective were always such that no 
cohort ever lost the ability to purchase alcoholic beverages. Therefore, no two cohorts were divided by the proposed 
effective dates. The pattern is best described as legislating an increase in the drinking age without disappointing the 
expectations of any cohort already old enough to vote.  
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gives us a nice way to understand why minimum age legislation has not seemed as troubling to 
the slippery slopers as, for example, gun control.41 
 Consider in this regard two kinds of incrementalism in the area of employment 
discrimination law. One concerns a statute that applies to employers with more than x 
employees, but over time amendments broaden its reach to employers with fewer and fewer 
employees. When large employers are targeted in the first step, family-owned businesses and 
local chambers of commerce stay out of the fray. Indeed, they might regard the legislation as 
welcome because it increases costs for their most threatening competitors. The second kind of 
incrementalism involves an expansion of protected classes by statute, agency, or court. A statute 
that permitted employment claims with respect to race might over time add sex, pregnancy, 
sexual preference, and age as relevant characteristics. This may be incrementalism, but defenders 
(and even advocates) are unlikely to divine the order in which these other protected classes will 
be added. There is no constitutional or natural ordinal ranking of attributes, or classes. As such, 
they might under-invest in litigation or other defensive tactics. There is a small divide-and-
conquer problem to the extent that some employers, and even industries, are more at risk with 
respect to some attributes than others. But for the most part, the expanded protection affects the 
same employers, and there is no danger that those who lost in the first round of legislation will 
favor further regulation in a subsequent round. Where there is neither irreversibility nor shifting 
coalitions, we do not have an incrementalism problem. By contrast, the expansion of coverage to 
smaller employers does present an incrementalism problem, though not one made more severe 
by irreversibility (except that employment rights are rarely withdrawn). Ultimately, it seems that 
we should be more wary of incrementalism as it applies to employer size than as applied to 
protected classes of employees. 
 
D. Incrementalism and Rent-Seeking 
 
The discussion thus far has approached the incrementalism problem, and the use of 
compensation as an antidote, with interest group coalitions, or power politics, in mind. The root 
of the problem, as identified and discussed in Part I, is that strategic incrementalism can divide 
and conquer groups. It can then push regulation far beyond the social optimum, or perhaps 
regulate the “wrong” groups rather than too many. One solution to this problem--a realignment 
of divided interest groups brought about by the promise of compensation in the event of a 
regulatory reversal--appears to be theoretically attractive but exceedingly difficult to design and 
                                                 
41 In the case of gun control, one would not expect the losers in an early step to turn and support more regulation 
in a subsequent step. But there is the potential for a divide-and-conquer strategy if hunters care mostly about rifles, 
and only support the absolutist position because they need allies or believe that the slippery slope will consume their 
passion. In any event, it is not an incrementalism problem of the worst kind because hunters and gun collectors, for 
example, are not competitors. 
In the case of abortion rights, the slippery slope claim is familiar but there seems to be little of an 
incrementalism problem. Both sides in the debate are well organized. More importantly, voters are well informed 
and involved, so legislation and judicial decisions seem to reflect a political and legal equilibrium rather than an 
incrementalist strategy. It is hard to see an interest on either side turning on its competitor.  
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execute. In this Section, the discussion turns away from the previous focus on divided and then 
realigned interest groups and toward the problem of interest group activity itself. This problem is 
often described as one of rent-seeking, an expression that refers to socially wasteful activity 
undertaken to influence law.42 If interest groups know that compensation is available, they will 
expend resources, or rent-seek, in attempts to recover costs, though these costs have passed 
under the metaphorical bridge.  
 One way to combat this waste would be to insist on the eradication of discretionary 
compensation. A government that could somehow precommit never to subsidize an industry and 
never to impose licensing requirements or tariffs that protected an industry, would be one that 
discouraged “rent-seeking.” Although uncompensated takings surely generate rent-seeking 
behavior, from a public choice perspective, it is difficult to understand why so much more 
attention is paid to government takings than to government subsidies or other programs.43 The 
                                                 
42 Rent-seeking can be understood by beginning with the canonical case where government has a monopoly to 
bestow, perhaps in the form of a license. If the monopoly position is worth x dollars to the monopolist, a supplicant, 
or interest group, would presumably pay as much as (x-1) dollars to acquire this privilege, or position. One famous 
advance in public choice was to see that economics had underestimated the “problem with monopoly” by focusing 
only on the deadweight loss caused by the monopolist who sells less of a good, at a price higher than marginal cost, 
than would sellers in a competitive market. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and 
Theft, 5 W. Econ. J. 224 (1967). Consumers who would pay more than marginal cost might be denied the good 
because of the monopoly pricing strategy, even though it would be efficient to transfer the good to someone ready to 
pay more than the marginal cost of producing it. The public choice insight is that the social cost of a monopoly is 
much greater because we must add to the aggregated deadweight loss that part of rent-seeking activity which is 
wasteful. Id. See also Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 807 
(1975). The resulting cost could be as great as or even greater than the expected profit from monopoly status. It 
could exceed the profit, for example, if competition caused one who had invested, say .5x dollars, in quest of the 
monopoly (worth x dollars) to regard that investment as a sunk cost, such that it was worth spending another x-1 
dollars at the margin to acquire the monopoly. In principle, there is no upper limit on the total social loss that might 
be generated when profit-maximizing entities compete for the monopoly. 
If aspiring monopolists simply bid for the license by paying money, then we have a mere transfer payment. In 
that case, there is no social waste apart from the deadweight loss attributable to monopoly pricing, though we might 
be offended if the government sold some things in this manner. Thus, if a cable channel is auctioned off to the 
highest bidder, we may bemoan the loss of a medium for public television or other noncommercial use, but at least 
the resource has gone to the highest valuing commercial user. On the other hand, if the channel is assigned by a 
politician, various broadcasters or interests might try to influence the political decision with campaign contributions, 
outright bribes, personal favors, paid “factfinding” trips, or multiple martini lunches. Some of these involve real 
waste; the politician is unlikely to value the bloated lunch as much as it costs a supplicant to provide it, and a highly 
paid job for the politician’s family member is unlikely to match that employee with a job well-suited to his or her 
skills. “Rent-seeking” comprises such waste. A plausible policy goal, or source of a theory about law, might be to 
structure things to minimize rent-seeking and, therefore, reduce social waste. 
43 Government “givings” also present incrementalism problems, especially if the givings, or benefits, are meant 
to produce reactions. I limit the discussion here to burdens and will confront givings issues in future work, where 
judicial rather than legislative decisions are at the forefront. For the present, note that givings necessarily come at a 
cost, and, unless this burden is spread across dispersed taxpayers and citizens, the cost will activate interest groups. 
In many settings, this is orthogonal to the incrementalism problem. Thus, if a proposed road imposes costs and 
benefits, interest groups will line up to avoid one road and enjoy the other. A tax scheme that took from the winners 
and compensated the losers might work wonders, but in most cases incrementalism is not implicated. See Donald G. 
Hagman, Windfalls and Their Recapture, in Windfalls for Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compensation 
15, 15-19 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds., 1978). In the example of a proposed road, its precise location, once 
worked out, sends strong signals about the likely extension of that road, so that there is more information rather than 
more dividing and conquering. 
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two can be equally wasteful in rent-seeking terms. But much as the discussion here considered 
regulatory reversals and other aspects of incrementalism without reinventing the wheel of takings 
law, it is now taken as a given that governments can subsidize one group at the expense of 
others. It may simply be too difficult to establish baselines from which unequal subsidies would 
be barred. Nevertheless, unfunded mandates may be acceptable or even desirable and, at the 
other extreme, a requirement that mandates be treated as compensable takings might also be 
acceptable. The worst choice, from the rent-seeking perspective, is one that allows interest 
groups to lobby for compensation. It is this norm of occasional, discretionary compensation that 
a legal system would strive to avoid in the interest of minimizing rent-seeking.  
 Discretionary compensation for regulatory burdens doubles the rent-seeking problem. 
Consider, for example, a proposal that old buildings be required to incorporate access ramps. An 
owner might face a one million dollar cost. That owner might spend up to one million dollars to 
forestall the regulation or to gain an exemption from it. In a world with broad regulatory takings, 
constitutional obligations to compensate property owners eliminate any incentives to lobby 
against the regulation. Of course, the compensation requirement itself might cause advocates to 
be less likely to succeed in gaining passage of the regulation, so that we cannot say whether 
compensation, even properly measured, is socially efficient. But with discretionary 
compensation, things are more complicated. The optimistic story is that the expected cost of each 
ramp decreases because there is some chance of full or partial compensation. If so, the affected 
property owner will not wish to invest as heavily in preventing the regulation. From a rent-
seeking perspective, this is good news. From a power politics perspective, however, it may be 
unfortunate inasmuch as it is desirable to have someone argue against the regulation at the risk of 
letting organized beneficiaries too often get their way at the expense of dispersed taxpayers. It is, 
however, the rent-seeking perspective that is pursued in this Section. 
 There is also a pessimistic, and probably more plausible, story. It is that the property 
owner must first worry about the one million dollar loss the ramp regulation would impose, and 
then, if the regulation passes or looks likely to pass, the property owner has the chance to recoup 
the one million dollars, provided that compensation can be obtained. If the steps are unlinked in 
this way, the rent-seeking potential doubles because there is first a one million dollar loss to 
worry about and then a one million dollar gain to pursue. If compensation is either mandated or 
forbidden, and there is no cheating through other legislation, there are one million dollars rather 
than two million dollars at stake, and less rent-seeking activity. This suggests yet another reason 
why the compensation explored in Section I.C and Section III.B above, as a solution to the 
incrementalism problem, may do more harm than good. If compensation accompanies a 
regulatory reversal, then it will likely double the rent-seeking activity; the reversal is, in the 
language of this discussion, discretionary.44 In short, from a rent-seeking perspective, the 
                                                 
44 The owner of a preexisting commercial building will fight the ramp requirement because there is no other 
interest group to ally with and because the regulatory burden is serious. I have described the effort to get residential 
property owners to join in the defense as fruitless. But if incrementalist regulation now moves to burden shops, it is 
possible that the earlier, regulated property owner can be induced to join in the defense--rather than root for the 
offense--in the interest of a level, competitive playing field. The inducement might be in the form of a reversal, so 
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incrementalism problem is made worse rather than better by guaranteeing compensation for 
over-regulation in the first steps, inasmuch as this over-regulation is determined by the 
discretionary step of voting down further regulation in a second step. 
 It is interesting that, as a matter of political practice, we do not find compensation 
precisely where the problem of incrementalism is most apparent. I resist starting with minimum 
age legislation because I have already argued that there is, strictly speaking, unlikely to be an 
incrementalism problem in these settings. It is more interesting, therefore, that we rarely find 
government-provided compensation where an earlier safety standard is overruled. There is 
neither compensation for the victims, when the old standard is deemed too lax, nor for the 
precaution-takers, though the old regulation is regarded as too extreme and costly. There are 
many possible explanations for this pattern, but a novel one is that we somehow recognize that 
such compensation would increase rent-seeking. If we are to compensate for the government’s 
past errors, it makes sense to make the compensation nondiscretionary, as the Fifth Amendment 
may have been intended to operate. Alternatively, we could put it in the hands of courts or 
agencies, if one dares to think that there is less rent-seeking in these domains. 
 
IV. Disclose and Delimit 
 
 The incrementalism problem has one potential solution that seeks to work on power 
politics without exacerbating rent-seeking and without running into the dangers of over- and 
under-compensation. The strategy is to force information about regulatory goals. Advocates at 
the outset of a campaign might be required to state their goal, or the import of their cost-benefit 
analysis, and then be barred from proceeding beyond this point for a specified period of time, 
which we might imagine to be five years. For example, if a proposal banned smoking in 
restaurants, advocates would be asked to declare where else they planned to propose bans. If they 
said that they were working on a proposal for bars but thought that hotels should do as they like 
on a floor-by-floor and free-market basis, then, for five years from the date of enactment of the 
first ban, hotels in the jurisdiction would be guaranteed freedom from such regulation. The idea 
is to avoid the incrementalism problem by fully informing the parties and encouraging them to 
form coalitions at the outset. 
 There are obvious problems with this disclose-and-delimit rule. The advocates may not 
be an easily identified group, and they may not be the same as those who favor the next, 
incremental step. Indeed, two groups of advocates may have such different aims that one pushes 
for the first step in order to force the delimitation that interferes with the second group’s aims. 
An optimistic response to this problem--and especially to the strategic behavior problem it 
                                                                                                                                                             
that there would be a package, combining the defeat of the proposal to expand retrofitting and a reversal of the 
earlier regulation. If this were about incremental smoking bans, a reversal would be valuable to the previously 
regulated restaurants. If it is about “irreversible” regulations, like costly ramps, reversal probably requires 
compensation. If the ramps in question could not have met a cost-benefit test, then the reversal does not eliminate 
the social cost of the regulation, but from the private party’s point of view reversal can be accomplished through 
compensation. In these settings, it is surely the case that there is double rent-seeking at stake. 
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raises--is that the disclosure process will simply force other groups to enter the fray at the first 
step, resulting in the best antidote to the problem of incrementalism. Still, the identification 
problem is not a small one, and it reconnects with the problem of defining incrementalism itself. 
The disclose-and-delimit rule has other weaknesses: it gives up on useful learning-from-
regulation and it forces law to stand still even in the face of technological or other changes that 
come about during the prescribed moratorium. Some of these drawbacks could be offset with 
compensation, but it is difficult to introduce compensation without making it discretionary and 
thus the cause of rent-seeking.  
 By way of example, imagine that home mortgages are soon regulated so that loans of 
more than ninety percent of the value of a property require debtor counseling or extra disclosure 
on the part of the originating bank. With a disclose-and-delimit approach, advocates of this 
regulation (including a regulator like the Federal Reserve) must say whether they intend to push 
the rule to cover eighty percent mortgages, second mortgages, and home equity loans. Covering 
eighty percent mortgages presents less of a divide-and-conquer issue because the same banks are 
regulated in both steps, but a push to cover home equity loans surely presents an incrementalism 
problem. Lenders who expect to specialize in home equity loans would be inclined to join in the 
defense against the first step’s ninety percent regulation if the regulator or other advocate 
disclosed that inclusion of home equity loans should be expected in a later step. Note that the 
immediately affected banks might prefer that the regulation extend to home equity lenders, 
especially once they are themselves regulated, but they are more inclined to be allied in the 
political process against all the regulation if the coalition can repel the first step. But what about 
later regulatory proposals regarding interest rates, font size for disclosure materials, and the like? 
A disclose-and-delimit rule that included all regulations affecting the subject matter seems 
absurd because it forces omnibus bills or calculations of a size previously unknown. And yet, a 
proposal regarding disclosure forms, maximum interest rates, or appraisal requirements might 
well be closer in political kind to the ninety percent rule than the others mentioned above. It is 
simply difficult to define subjects in a way that allows us to say what is incremental and what is 
sufficiently unrelated. The problem is akin to, but surely more serious than, that which 
accompanies a single-subject rule for legislation.45 
 But a second example suggests the promise of the disclose-and-delimit idea. Imagine that 
the threat of serious climate change generates a proposal for a carbon tax. Political opposition 
comes from various industries. We might imagine that the first proposal sets a modest carbon tax 
that exempts, directly or on a pass-through basis, the carbon consumption of specified industries, 
such as steel and automobile manufacturers. The incrementalist “problem,” or perhaps blessing, 
is that aluminum and other interests might soon turn on the exempt industries. A disclose-and-
delimit rule provides a period in which the tax cannot be extended to these other industries. 
Similarly, if instead of a carbon tax, legislation required aluminum and other manufacturers to 
                                                 
45 See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 803 (2006) 
(describing history of, justifications for, and inconsistent application of the single-subject rule found in many state 
constitutions and applicable to legislation). 
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switch away from a high-carbon energy source, the switching requirement could not be extended 
in incremental fashion during the period of delimitation. In both cases, the rule encourages an 
upfront coalition and a political discussion. The alternative of compensating the aluminum 
makers for their investments if the switching requirement is reversed may also be workable. 
 To be sure, interest groups may simply not believe that the disclose-and-delimit (or 
compensation) rule will be enforced. A future legislature can override a previously enacted rule, 
and of course there will be rent-seeking losses in the process of convincing this second 
legislature to do so or not to do so. This is the familiar and difficult problem of governmental 
precommitment, and the solutions to it draw on ideas about constitutional constraints and 
political reputation. Political reputation might well do the job, but only if the public perceives 
that incrementalism has been well defined. This might be so if advocates, or the legislation itself, 
could specify all the steps that could not be taken for five years. A ban on assault weapons might 
say: “No further ban, tax, or registration requirement shall be imposed for five years following 
the effective date of this statute on the firearms defined herein, and no ban, tax, registration 
requirement, or liability rule shall be imposed on any firearm not defined herein.” A proposal to 
require a safety class or to require hunters to wear blaze orange might then pass because voters 
perceive that the ambiguity in the delimitation provision should be resolved in favor of safety 
legislation. In contrast, a proposal to issue hunting licenses only to persons over the age of 
twenty-one might be understood as a further, incremental ban and, given the law passed earlier, 
political pressure might make presentation or passage very difficult. In the carbon example, a 
legislature that violated the moratorium by extending the carbon tax to the automobile industry 
would probably face political repercussions, but one that did so as part of a package including 
bailout funds would not. A government that required a particular environment-friendly 
technology would probably face serious opposition if it sought to renege on a commitment to 
compensate. Gun control and a carbon tax are more difficult subjects of compensation, whether 
promised upfront or in the event of a regulatory reversal. In sum, it is difficult to generalize 
about the credibility of promises to delimit or to compensate. There are settings where each 
promise seems reasonably credible. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Incremental regulation can divide interest groups against one another, whereas better 
laws might emerge from a process that is more transparent, less path-dependent, and more likely 
to bring affected interests to the table at one time. If interested parties with full information 
would have defeated a proposal, then it is troubling–-though sometimes fortunate–-that a step-
by-step approach engineered, or stumbled upon, by advocates of the same proposal might 
succeed in gaining that which would have failed. The problem is more than a mere voting 
paradox because the defeat of the all-or-nothing proposal is a stable result. This incrementalism 
problem negates some of the enthusiasm otherwise attached to moderation in legislation, agency 
regulation, and even judicial decisions. At the same time, it is difficult to know when 
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incrementalism is a problem. Irreversibility surely plays some role, and the prospect of learning-
from-regulation offers something of a counterforce, though less than usually imagined. The 
problem is most likely present when the burdened groups are competitors who might turn on one 
another, and when the advocates are well organized or simply bear few costs.  
 Even where we are certain that there is troubling incrementalism, it is a difficult problem 
to solve. Compensation can undo past regulations and bring interest groups together where they 
were once divided and conquered, but it introduces new misalignments in the world of power 
politics and, when discretionary, it increases wasteful rent-seeking as well. Compensation may 
double the problem rather than solve it. Disclosure is another problem-solving tool, but it can do 
more harm than good where incremental regulation is favored by disparate groups. 
 One modest conclusion is that the incrementalism problem offers a means of 
understanding why some slippery slopes seem more troubling than others. Another is that 
incrementalism has acquired far too good a name. More drastic changes, especially if they do not 
impose large, upfront, irreversible costs, might well be superior to incrementalism. I have 
emphasized relatively mundane examples, such as smoking bans and disability accommodations, 
because the mechanics of incrementalism are most readily observed in familiar, reasonably 
settled areas. But we have yet to confront incrementalism as it pertains to less settled matters, 
such as climate change policy and health care reform. These are fields in which some awareness 
of the problem of incrementalism is more likely to illuminate legal and policy choices than is the 
rhetoric of the slippery slope.  
 It is difficult to solve a problem that is barely in the eye of the beholder. One person’s 
incremental change is another’s dramatic upheaval. Every law can be described as a step toward 
another. And yet there is reason to think that we can identify situations where a proposed change 
falls short of its advocates’ wishes, and where an interest opposed to and burdened by this first 
change would have reason, once it loses, to join the other side and encourage further change. In 
these situations some skepticism about moderation is in order, and a disclose-or-delimit rule, or 
even a mandatory retroactive compensation rule, may hold promise. 
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